THE BRADY-JOHNSON PROGRAM IN GRAND STRATEGY
YALE UNIVERSITY

STUDIES IN GRAND STRATEGY

SPRING 2015

(2/12/15 version)

Instructors: John Lewis Gaddis, Charles Hill, Adam Tooze, Paul Kennedy, David Brooks, John Negroponte, and Paul Solman with guest discussion leaders

Course administrators: Dr. Jeremy Friedman <Jeremy.friedman@yale.edu> and Kathleen Galo <kathleen.galo@yale.edu>

Course numbers: HIST 985 01: ID # 21097
                MGT 984 01: ID # 20253 (this section only for SOM-MBA students)

Spring meeting time: Mondays (including reading week), 3:30 – 5:20 p.m.

Spring location: Locations: Athenians: 217B and Spartans: 220B

COURSE OBJECTIVES

This two-semester course examines the theory and practice of grand strategy in historical and contemporary contexts from a variety of analytical perspectives. It defines grand strategy as ‘the calculated relation of means to large ends’. It focuses on how parts relate to the whole in whatever an individual, a corporation or a nation might be seeking to accomplish.

The strategists considered range over two and a half millennia. Some represent the best thinking and writing on this subject; others exemplify success and failure in the implementation of grand strategy. From a careful examination of them, we expect you to extract a set of principles for the making of grand strategy that will be useful in any future leadership role in which you may be called upon to connect desired ends with available means.

COURSE STRUCTURE AND REQUIREMENTS

The course consists of a two-semester interdisciplinary seminar and an individual summer project. The first semester ranges from Sun Tzu in the 6th century B.C. through the end of the Cold War. The second semester focuses on contemporary grand strategy with respect to such issues as national security; economics and finance; technology; the environment; energy resources; culture and ideology; ethics and international law; as well as the competition between democracy and authoritarianism in shaping the post-Cold War international system. This portion of the course will include team-prepared policy briefs, together with an end-of-semester crisis simulation exercise.

Students must take both semesters of the seminar. They must also undertake a summer research project, internship, or odyssey, focusing on some particular aspect of strategy, whether of a historical or a contemporary character. They will also be expected to attend separately scheduled faculty workshops and lectures by distinguished guests.

SPRING SEMINAR
Requirements for the first semester include preparation for and participation in weekly discussion sessions, each involving substantial reading. Students will also write three essays on topics drawn from these, of which the first two are assigned and the third is to be negotiated with the instructors.

*The essays must not exceed 2000 words in length.* Each will be graded by a different set of instructors, so that by the end of the semester, all of them will have evaluated your work. Essays should be submitted both in hardcopy (deposited in the box outside room 209 at International Security Studies, 31 Hillhouse Avenue), and via email as an MS-Word attachment to Jeremy Friedman <jeremy.friedman@yale.edu> and Kathleen Galo <kathleen.galo@yale.edu>. Late papers will get lower grades. Submission deadlines are as follows:

→ Monday, 9 February 2014 First paper due
→ Monday, 23 March 2014 Second paper due
→ Monday, 20 April 2014 Third paper due

**First topic:**
Consider the grand strategies discussed in Sun Tzu, Thucydides, and our readings on the Romans. Are there similarities of sufficient consequence to suggest the existence of grand strategic and economic principles that transcend time and place? If so, what are they? If not, what differences rule out making such generalizations? Be sure to cite specific examples from each of the three cases in making your argument.

**Second topic:**
Taking no more than a page, state your own understanding of Clausewitz’s great principle that “war is a continuation of policy by other means.” Then review what you have read by or about Machiavelli, Philip II, Elizabeth I and Adam Smith. To what extent did each of them anticipate Clausewitz’s principle? This essay, together with the first and the third, must also reflect your instructors’ great principle that “good writing is a continuation of clear thinking by means of ink or its modern equivalent.”

**Third topic:**
This one is up to you. We especially encourage you, in this assignment, to connect your own personal experiences with the spring semester readings and discussions. Here are some suggested topics – feel free to choose one of these without consulting the GS faculty. If, however, you come up with one not on this list, please check with Professors Hill, Gaddis, or Dr. Friedman before proceeding.

1. Apply the concept of grand strategy, as you understand it, to one of the following: business, the arts, law, athletics, ambition, or romance.
2. To what extent have geography or culture or ideology affected the grand strategy one or more states?
3. Devise and defend a lexicon of key concepts in grand strategy.
4. Discuss the utility of distinguishing between the levels at which grand strategy operates, for example: political guidance, operational planning, and tactical improvisation. Cite specific cases to illustrate your argument.
5. To what extent can leaders plan for unexpected developments? Cite specific examples of those who have done so well or badly?
6. What must the grand strategist do in the face of limited resources or limited knowledge?
7. What’s the difference between being focused, being balanced and being comprehensive? Assess the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
8. To what extent do the requirements of leadership exempt the leader from personal standards of morality? If they do, to what other standards is the leader accountable?
9. Since the object in war is to obtain an acceptable peace, war must always be conducted with that goal in mind. Please discuss.
10. What are the strengths and weaknesses of planning versus improvisation?
11. What’s the relationship between personal character, on the one hand, and the making of grand strategy, on the other?
12. Assume the existence of four major actors, three of whom conclude that grand strategies are impossible because their world is too complex. What opportunities – or problems – does that create for the fourth?

13. To what extent should one declare openly what one’s grand strategy is? To what extent should one keep it closely held? Assess the relative advantages of each approach.

14. Does hegemony generate its own resistance? If so, why should any state seek it?

15. What is the role of style – that is, a particular, distinctive, or characteristic manner of acting – in shaping grand strategy?

**Summer research project**

During the spring semester, each student will be expected to consult individually with one or more of the GS faculty and with Dr. Friedman on a summer project. If approved, funding will normally be available for these projects averaging $2,500 – 3,000 per student, and students are highly encouraged to seek out sources of supplementary funds. Please submit a one-page project outline by February 16, 2014. The final application, including a budget, proposal, and CV, is due on March 23, 2014 via studentgrants.yale.edu.

**Grading**

Students from Yale College will receive a traditional letter grade for each semester of the course. Other students will receive grades in accordance with the grading systems of their respective schools. All students should expect their grades to be based upon a combination of in-class contributions, participation in Grand Strategy and ISS-sponsored events, oral presentations, and written work throughout the year, including the summer project.

**Preparation over the Winter break**

*Students must begin preparation for the course over the winter break.* At a minimum this includes reading the introductory PDFs, beginning to read Freedman, and preparing for the first seminar session on Sun Tzu or Thucydides.

**Required reading for the Spring seminar**

Required reading for the weekly sessions includes a combination of books and readings to be posted on the classesv2 server, *all listed under “core reading.”* Books marked with an asterisk (*) should be purchased on-line or through your preferred book vendor. No books will be pre-ordered through any local bookstore.

**Supplementary reading for the Spring seminar**

The syllabus includes supplementary material for each week which you are not required to read for class. You may find these lists helpful for future reference, however, or perhaps even for some of the writing you do for this course.

**Workshops**

The GS professors will, on certain Mondays after class – see below for specific details – run workshops on particular topics for the entire class. Your attendance at these sessions is required, so plan accordingly. We will provide a light dinner at these events.

**Lectures and dinner discussions**

Throughout the year, there will be a number of special lectures and dinner discussions, often featuring distinguished visitors to campus. Your attendance at all such lectures is expected. Because seating is limited, attendance at dinner discussions is on a “first come, first served” basis. Kathleen Galo, ISS Program Coordinator, will take reservations for these, which tend to go quickly.

**Questions**
Please direct any course-related questions to Dr. Jeremy Friedman, Associate Director of The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy, at <Jeremy.friedman@yale.edu> or Kathleen Galo, MA, ISS Program Coordinator, at <kathleen.galo@yale.edu>.
STUDIES IN GRAND STRATEGY

SPRING SYLLABUS

Required text:

Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. This book, the first comprehensive history of strategy in modern times, is to be read on your own, but with the expectation that you’ll have completed all of it by the end of the spring term.

Core reading: Available on the Classes V2 Server, to be read before the first class convenes.


General background reading: Optional reading, for further background.


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TOPIC 1: SUN TZU

Discussion Leaders: Scott Boorman, Jeremy Friedman, Philip Haun

This session will center on Sun Tzu’s *Art of War* (5th Century B.C.), which is the paramount treatise within the Ancient Chinese ‘School of Strategy’. We will consider contemporary application of Master Sun’s strategic theories to actual practice in politics, statecraft, diplomacy, intelligence, and war. Throughout the session, we will question the efficacy of Sun Tzu’s central thesis that the means of manipulation and the ways of deception are essential for achieving the ends of supremacy and success.

Core reading:

Supplementary reading:
TOPIC 2: THUCYDIDES

Discussion Leaders: Charles Hill, David Brooks

In this session we will concentrate on the internal logic of Thucydides’s classic history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). Particular emphasis will be placed on certain events: the archaeology that opens the book; the crisis over Epidamnus; the debate at Sparta; the speeches of Pericles; the plague; the stasis at Coreæ; the Melian dialogue; Alcibiades and the Hermæ; and the Sicilian campaign. Certain themes also will be stressed: nature, history, the polis, culture and human disaster. The aim will be to explore the ‘grand’ aspect of grand strategy as in ‘all-inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’, more than the aggregation of the decisions and actions of leaders.

Core reading:

Supplementary reading:
Victor Davis Hanson, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and the Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War (New York: Random House, 2005).
Tom Holland, Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West (New York: Doubleday, 2006)
TOPIC 3: THE ROMANS

Discussion Leaders: John Gaddis, Charles Hill, Paul Solman

In this session we will consider the Roman Empire as a unipolar world, a power configuration not to be seen again until the United States emerged as the world’s only super-power after the Cold War ended. We will explore the question of whether Roman hegemony reflected the existence of what we would now consider to be a grand strategy and if so what it was. Emphasis will be placed on the reasons the empire rose and fell, and why it lasted as long as it did. We will also consider what if anything the United States, in its own ‘unipolar moment’, might learn from the Roman precedent.

Core reading:

Supplementary reading:
In this session we will examine in its entirety *The Prince*, by Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), with a dual focus. On the one hand will be Machiavelli’s angle of vision: why he and his classic text are associated with the rise of modern politics and the rise of the modern nation-state. On the other hand will be the precise formula Machiavelli elaborates for statecraft and the ideas from which it derives. Particular emphasis will be placed upon Machiavelli’s philosophy of history; the use of history by leaders; the role of fate, fortune and chance; and the relationship between individual leaders and their specific historical contexts.

**Core reading:**

  
* Niccolo Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, Book I (all); Book II, chs. 1-5, 13, 21, 29, 33; Book III, chs. 1-5, 35, 40-42, 48
  

**Supplementary reading:**

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
TOPIC 5: PHILIP II and ELIZABETH I

Discussion Leaders: Adam Tooze, Paul Kennedy, Paul Solman

This session takes as its historical setting the positions of and relations between the European powers of the 16th and 17th centuries. Its key theme will be the connections between values, interests and ambitions; policies; strategies; and practice. More specifically, we will compare and contrast the grand strategies of Philip II and Elizabeth I, the first being the absolute monarch of a world-wide empire in Europe and Asia, with massive resources in land, troops and money, the second being Queen of a much smaller, poorer and far less populous island-state. How do we explain why the policies of the latter were so much more successful than those of the former? And what role did Philip's religious conviction and bureaucratic methods play in this story, along with those more traditional measures of national power such as budgets, navies/armies and geography?

Core reading:

Supplementary reading:
TOPIC 6: KANT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

Discussion Leaders: Charles Hill, Bryan Garsten

We will consider the relation between war, commerce and constitution-building. We will concentrate on late eighteenth and early nineteenth century thought about progress and the relation between commercial activity, security strategy, and the construction of republican constitutionalism. We will also begin to explore the legacy of such thought to the twentieth century by examining the constitutional documents of the League of Nations and the United Nations.

Core reading:
Federalist #1-13, 23-25, 28, 30-31, 37, 49-51.
URL: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm
Charter of the United Nations (1945), full text, esp. preamble and chapters 1-3, 6-7.
URLs: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart.htm or http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/

Supplementary reading on Kant:

Supplementary reading on Constant:
In this session we will focus on the single most influential work of grand strategy, Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* (1832). We will consider the circumstances that led Clausewitz (1780-1831) to write this book – chiefly on the rise of the European state system, the Napoleonic challenge to it and the lessons Clausewitz drew therefrom. We will pay particular attention to the concepts Clausewitz introduced in grand strategy: the subordination of war to statecraft, the idea of friction, the role of uncertainty and the function of planning. We will also discuss the particular difficulties of reading this work and the ways in which it has been interpreted – or misinterpreted – since its publication. Finally, we will consider the ways in which certain American leaders have used Clausewitz’s ideas as well as the relevance of his thinking for the post-Cold War world.

**Core reading:**
‘On the Nature of War’, book I, chapters 1-8
‘On the Theory of War’, book II, chapters 1-6
‘On Strategy in General: Strategy’, book III, chapter 1
‘War Plans: Introduction; Absolute War and Real War; War Is an Instrument of Policy’, book VIII, chapters 1, 2, 6B

**Supplementary reading:**
TOPIC 8: METTERNICH AND BISMARCK

Discussion Leaders: Adam Tooze, Charles Hill

We will explore peace-planning and international institution-building in practice by examining the 1815 Congress of Vienna that put an end to the Napoleonic wars and the international system that it produced, embodied in the Concert of Europe. We will concentrate mainly upon the strategic approach of Clemens Wenzel Lothar von Metternich (1773-1859) of Austria. This will be contrasted with the revolutionary innovation in European international politics brought about by one of the greatest figures of nineteenth century history, Otto von Bismarck (1810-1898). Though widely regarded as a wild, irresponsible Junker, he was brought into power in 1862 to solve the Prussian constitutional crisis, led Prussia into three successful wars (vs. Denmark, Austria, and France), created the Second German Empire in 1871, and was the dominant force in European politics for the next two decades. A conservative revolutionary? A genius who, alas, groomed no competent successor? A harbinger of Germany’s later, demonic fate?

Core reading:

Supplementary reading on Bismarck:

Supplementary reading on Metternich:


TOPIC 9: LINCOLN AND THE REUNIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Discussion Leaders: John Gaddis, Bryan Garsten, David Brooks

This week’s topic focuses on how the United States, a weak state on the periphery of the international system founded at the end of the 18th century upon a constitutional contradiction – that the rights of man could coexist with the legality of slavery – managed, if at great cost, not only to resolve that contradiction but also to emerge, by the end of the 19th century, as a unified state of such strength that the international system was reconfiguring itself to accommodate American leadership. Our emphasis is on the pivotal moment in that process – the Civil War – and on the equally pivotal grand strategy of Abraham Lincoln.

Core reading:

Supplemental reading:
TOPIC 10: IMPERIAL GEOPOLITICS

Discussion Leaders: Adam Tooze, Paul Kennedy, Jeremy Friedman

By the end of the nineteenth century, the small archipelago of the United Kingdom—a multi-national “composite state”—dominated the world’s industrial production, possessed unchallengeable naval power, and controlled one-quarter of the world’s land surface. But as newer Great Powers emerged, Britain faced challenges in all corners of the globe: in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Pacific; scrambling for new holdings in Africa; using its critical Indian base as a platform for further imperial interventions while jealously guarding British supremacy on the subcontinent. This week’s readings look at the complex relations between the British metropole and its diverse imperial holdings in the decades between the Crimean War and the First World War. Policy-makers had to treat the empire as an intricate ecology: actions taken in one colonial theater could prompt unexpected reverberations in distant hemispheres. Nor could those maintaining and expanding the “Pax Britannica” simply dictate policy to acquiescent possessions: colonial interests had to be balanced, local elites coopted, and the possibility of a new geopolitical structure, that of the “world state,” anxiously contemplated.

Core Reading:


Supplementary reading:


Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy; Background Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1865-1980, (London, 1981), esp. 74-139.


Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line: white men’s countries and the international challenge of racial equality (Cambridge, UK, 2008).


TOPIC 11: THE GRAND STRATEGY OF PROTEST MOVEMENTS

Discussion Leader: Beverly Gage

Core reading:


(supplementary reading to come)
TOPIC 12: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER

Discussion Leaders: Adam Tooze, Paul Solman

In the twentieth century both the national economy and the global economy took on a new central significance in grand strategy. Indeed, reconnecting the economy, which had been set free of state interference in the 19th century, with military power was for many definitional of grand strategy in the twentieth century. There were many ways of thinking this connection. Autarchic national economics in the case of fascism, Stalin’s socialism in one country and insurgent land reform as a slogan of agrarian revolution were three modes. But all of these strategies had to contend with one overwhelming reality: the dominance in the field of economic power of the liberal powers, first Britain and then the United States. Indeed, for those dedicated to insurgency against those powers, whether from the right or the left, their reliance on economics, their attempt to hide political power behind the operations of a “neutral” economics sphere was what truly set liberal grand strategy apart. This unit will address the role of economics in America’s dominance by sketching a history of international political economy from World War I down to the present. But the question that is implied is an urgent one of the present: when America’s economic dominance wanes, when its power is defined more and more in military terms, has a fundamental tipping point been reached?

Core reading:
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political pp53-79.
Carl Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth, pp240-258.
Zhou Xiaochuan, “Zhou Xiaochuan’s Statement on Reforming the International Monetary System,”

Supplementary reading:


_, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*, (Routledge, 1987).


TOPIC 13: THE GRAND STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY

Discussion Leaders: Jeremy Friedman, Elizabeth Bradley

How is the conduct of grand strategy different without the resources of a state at one’s disposal? By the second half of the twentieth century, the combination of technological improvements in transport, media, and arms, combined with ideological struggle and the collapse of empires, made asymmetric conflict perhaps the dominant mode of warfare. This session will examine questions of organization, personnel, ideology, diplomacy, and military strategy and tactics from the perspective of insurgent movements.

Core reading:


Supplementary reading:


Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Trans. by Richard Philcox, (Grove Press, 2005).


Abbie Hoffman, Steal This Book, (Da Capo Press, 2002).


TOPIC 14: THE COLD WAR

Discussion Leaders: John Gaddis, Jeremy Friedman, John Negroponte

In this session we will focus on the Cold War as a whole, the three previous topics having dealt with more specific aspects of it. This then will provide a foundation for our more detailed analysis of the post-Cold War world during the first four weeks of the fall semester.

Core reading:


Supplementary reading:

________ and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), three volumes.