STUDIES IN GRAND STRATEGY

SPRING 2013

(3/11/13 version)

Instructors: John Lewis Gaddis, Charles Hill, Paul Kennedy, David Brooks, John Negroponte, and Paul Solman with guest discussion leaders

Course administrators: Dr. Jeremy Friedman <Jeremy.friedman@yale.edu> and Kathleen Murphy <kathleen.murphy@yale.edu>

Course numbers:
- HIST 985: Section 01 ID # 20661 and Section 02 ID# 23204
- PLSC 715: Section 01 ID # 20660 and Section 02 ID# 23203
- MGT 984: Section 01 ID # 20253 and Section 02 ID# 23200 (only for SOM-MBA students)

Spring meeting time: Mondays (including reading week), 3:30 – 5:20 p.m.

Spring location: Locations: Athenians: HGS 217B and Spartans: HGS 220B

COURSE OBJECTIVES

This two-semester course examines the theory and practice of grand strategy in historical and contemporary contexts from a variety of analytical perspectives. It defines grand strategy as ‘the calculated relation of means to large ends’. It focuses on how parts relate to the whole in whatever an individual, a corporation or a nation might be seeking to accomplish.

The strategists considered range over some two and a half millennia. Some represent the best thinking and writing on this subject; others exemplify success and failure in the implementation of grand strategy. From a careful examination of them, we expect you to extract a set of principles for the making of grand strategy that will be useful in any future leadership role in which you may be called upon to connect desired ends with available means.

COURSE STRUCTURE AND REQUIREMENTS

The course consists of a two-semester interdisciplinary seminar and an individual summer project. The first semester ranges from Sun Tzu in the 6th century B.C. through the end of the Cold War. The second semester focuses on contemporary grand strategy with respect to such issues as national security; economics and finance; technology; the environment; energy resources; culture and ideology; ethics and international law; as well as the competition between democracy and authoritarianism in shaping the post-Cold War international system. This portion of the course will include team-prepared policy briefs, together with an end-of-semester crisis simulation exercise.

Students must take both semesters of the seminar. They must also undertake a summer research project, internship, or odyssey, focusing on some particular aspect of strategy, whether of a historical or a contemporary character. They must also attend separately scheduled lectures by distinguished guests during the Spring and Fall terms.

SPRING SEMINAR

Requirements for the first semester of the seminar include preparation for and participation in weekly discussion sessions, each involving substantial reading. Students will also write three essays on topics drawn from these, of which the first two are assigned and the third is to be negotiated with the instructors.

The essays must not exceed 2000 words in length. Each will be graded by a different set of instructors, so that by the end of the semester, all of them will have evaluated your work. Essays should be submitted both in hardcopy (deposited in the box outside room 209 at International Security Studies, 31 Hillhouse Avenue), and via email as an...
First topic:
Consider the grand strategies discussed in Sun Tzu, Thucydides, and our readings on the Romans. Are there similarities of sufficient consequence to suggest the existence of grand strategic principles that transcend time and place? If so, what are they? If not, what differences rule out making such generalizations? Be sure to cite specific examples from each of the three cases in making your argument.

Second topic:
Taking no more than a page, state your own understanding of Clausewitz’s great principle that “war is a continuation of policy by other means.” Then review what you have read by or about Machiavelli, Philip II and Elizabeth I and and Adam Smith. To what extent did each of them anticipate Clausewitz’s principle? This essay, together with the first and the third, must also reflect your instructors’ great principle that “good writing is a continuation of clear thinking by means of ink or its modern equivalent.”

Third topic:
This one is up to you. We especially encourage you, in this assignment, to connect your own personal experiences with the spring semester readings and discussions. Here are some suggested topics – feel free to choose one of these without consulting the GS faculty. If, however, you come up with one not on this list, please check with Professors Hill, Gaddis, or Dr. Friedman before proceeding.

1. Apply the concept of grand strategy, as you understand it, to one of the following: business, the arts, law, athletics, ambition, or romance.
2. To what extent have geography or culture or ideology affected the grand strategy one or more states?
3. Devise and defend a lexicon of key concepts in grand strategy.
4. Discuss the utility of distinguishing between the levels at which grand strategy operates, for example: political guidance, operational planning, and tactical improvisation. Cite specific cases to illustrate your argument.
5. To what extent can leaders plan for unexpected developments? Cite specific examples of those who have done so well or badly?
6. What must the grand strategist do in the face of limited resources or limited knowledge?
7. What’s the difference between being focused, being balanced and being comprehensive? Assess the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
8. To what extent do the requirements of leadership exempt the leader from personal standards of morality? If they do, to what other standards is the leader accountable?
9. Since the object in war is to obtain an acceptable peace, war must always be conducted with that goal in mind. Please discuss.
10. What are the strengths and weaknesses of planning versus improvisation?
11. What’s the relationship between personal character, on the one hand, and the making of grand strategy, on the other?
12. Assume the existence of four major actors, three of them conclude that grand strategies are impossible because their world is too complex. What opportunities – or problems – does that create for the fourth?
13. To what extent should one declare openly what one’s grand strategy is? To what extent should one keep it closely held? Assess the relative advantages of each approach.
14. Does hegemony generate its own resistance? If so, why should any state seek it?
15. What is the role of style – that is, a particular, distinctive, or characteristic manner of acting – in shaping grand strategy?

Summer research project
During the spring semester, each student will be expected to consult individually with one or more of the GS faculty and with Dr. Friedman on a summer project. If approved, funding will normally be available for these projects up to roughly $5,000. Please submit a one-page project outline by February 18, 2013. The final application, including a budget, proposal, and CV, is due on March 25, 2013 via studentgrants.yale.edu. Preliminary reports on the summer project are to be submitted in draft form by Monday, 10 September and final form (5,000 – 8,000 words) by no Monday, 12 November 2013.
**Grading**

Students from the Graduate School and Yale College will receive a grade for each semester of the course. Other students will receive grades in accordance with the grading systems of their respective schools. All students should expect their grades to be based upon a combination of in-class discussion contributions, participation in Grand Strategy and ISS-sponsored events, oral presentations, and written work throughout the year, including the summer project.

**Preparation over the Winter break**

Students must begin preparation for the course over the winter break. At a minimum this includes reading the introductory reading packet and preparing for the first seminar session on Sun Tzu or Thucydides.

**Required reading for the Spring seminar**

Required reading for the weekly sessions includes a combination of books and readings to be posted on the classesv2 server, all listed under “core reading.” Books marked with an asterisk (*) should be purchased on-line or through your preferred book vendor. No books will be pre-ordered through any local bookstore.

**Supplementary reading for the Spring seminar**

The syllabus includes supplementary material for each week which you are not required to read for class. You may find these lists helpful for future reference, however, or perhaps even for some of the writing you do for this course.

**Workshops**

The GS professors will, on certain Mondays after class – see below for specific details – run workshops on particular topics for the entire class. Your attendance at these sessions is required, so plan accordingly. We will provide a light dinner at these events.

**Lectures and dinner discussions**

Throughout the year, there will be a number of special lectures and dinner discussions, often featuring distinguished visitors to campus. Your attendance at all such lectures is expected. Because seating is limited, attendance at dinner discussions is on a “first come, first served” basis. Kathleen Murphy, ISS Program Coordinator, will take reservations for these, which tend to go quickly.

**Questions**

Please direct any course-related questions to Dr. Jeremy Friedman, Associate Director of The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy, at <Jeremy.friedman@yale.edu> or Kathleen Murphy, MA, ISS Program Coordinator, at <kathleen.murphy@yale.edu>.
STUDIES IN GRAND STRATEGY

SPRING SYLLABUS

INTRODUCTION (TO BE READ DURING WINTER BREAK) DISTRIBUTED IN DECEMBER

Core reading:

General background reading (to be read on your own if you desire):


**Historical atlases:**

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### Weekly Topic Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Athenians Topic/Discussion leader(s)</th>
<th>Spartans Topic/Discussion leader(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 January</td>
<td>Topic 1: Sun Tzu</td>
<td>Topic 2: Thucydides</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Gaddis, Scott Boorman, David Howell</td>
<td>Charles Hill, David Brooks</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.B.: Special Workshop after class</td>
<td>Note-taking, writing, and summer funding: Charles Hill, John Gaddis, Paul Solman, Jeremy Friedman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday, 18 January</td>
<td>Topic 2: Thucydides</td>
<td>Topic 1: Sun Tzu</td>
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<tr>
<td>(MLK holiday adjustment – no class sessions on 21 January)</td>
<td>Charles Hill, David Brooks</td>
<td>John Gaddis, Scott Boorman, David Howell</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 January</td>
<td>Topic 4: Machiavelli</td>
<td>Topic 3: The Romans</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.B.: Special Workshop after class</td>
<td>Bryan Garsten, David Brooks</td>
<td>John Gaddis, Charles Hill</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Economic Point of View and Grand Strategy: Paul Solman</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 February</td>
<td>Topic 3: The Romans</td>
<td>Topic 4: Machiavelli</td>
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<td></td>
<td>John Gaddis, Charles Hill</td>
<td>Bryan Garsten, David Brooks</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 February</td>
<td>Topic 5: Philip II and Elizabeth I</td>
<td>Topic 6: Kant and Constitutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.B.: Paper #1 due today February 11</td>
<td>John Gaddis, Paul Solman, Paul Kennedy</td>
<td>Charles Hill and Bryan Garsten</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 February</td>
<td>Topic 6: Kant and Constitutionalism</td>
<td>Topic 5: Philip II and Elizabeth I</td>
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<td>Special Workshop after class: Adam Smith: Paul Solman</td>
<td>Charles Hill and Bryan Garsten</td>
<td>John Gaddis, Paul Solman, Paul Kennedy</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 February</td>
<td>Topic 7: Clausewitz</td>
<td>Topic 8: Metternich and Bismarck</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Workshop after class: Karl Marx: Paul Solman</td>
<td>John Gaddis</td>
<td>Charles Hill and Adam Tooze</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 March</td>
<td>Topic 8: Metternich and Bismarck</td>
<td>Topic 7: Clausewitz</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Hill and Adam Tooze</td>
<td>John Gaddis</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.B.: Paper #2 due today</td>
<td>John Gaddis, Bryan Garsten, David Brooks</td>
<td>Paul Kennedy, Stuart Semmel, and Amanda Behm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April</td>
<td>Topic 10: Imperial Geopolitics</td>
<td>Topic 9: Lincoln and the Reunification of the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Workshop after class: Keynes and Hayek: Paul Solman</td>
<td>Paul Kennedy, Stuart Semmel, and Amanda Behm</td>
<td>John Gaddis, Bryan Garsten, David Brooks</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>Topic 12: Democratic Geopolitics</td>
<td>Topic 11: Communist Grand Strategy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>John Gaddis, John Negroponte, David Brooks</td>
<td>Adam Tooze and Jeremy Friedman</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 April</td>
<td>Topic 11: Communist Grand</td>
<td>Topic 12: Democratic Geopolitics</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Authors</td>
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<td>22 April</td>
<td>Topic 13: The Cold War</td>
<td>John Gaddis, Charles Hill, and Jeremy Friedman</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 April</td>
<td>Topic 14: The End of the Cold War</td>
<td>John Gaddis, John Negroponte, David Brooks, Jeremy Friedman</td>
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N.B.: Paper #3 due today
TOPIC 1: SUN TZU

Discussion Leaders: John Gaddis, Scott Boorman, David Howell

This session will center on a modern translation of an ancient text, Sun Tzu’s Art of War (6th century B.C.), and will highlight contemporary issues, such as the relationship of theory to actual practice, of strategy to structure, and the use of modern resources. The comparison of three more literal translations from both Eastern and Western scholars to the primary text will underscore the range of interpretations of this classic strategy work. We will close the session with a discussion of Sun Tzu’s thought as applied to various wars, including the War on Terror.

CORE READING:

SUPPLEMENTARY READING:
- Sima Qian 司馬遷, "The Biographies of Sun Tzu and Wu Ch'i 孫子吳起烈傳," in Shi Ji 《史記》 no. 65 (c. 97 BC).
TOPIC 2: THUCYDIDES

Discussion Leaders: Charles Hill, David Brooks

In this session we will concentrate on the internal logic of Thucydides’s classic history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). Particular emphasis will be placed on certain events: the archaeology that opens the book; the crisis over Epidamnus; the debate at Sparta; the speeches of Pericles; the plague; the stasis at Corcyra; the Melian dialogue; Alcibiades and the Hermae; and the Sicilian campaign. Certain themes also will be stressed: nature, history, the polis, culture and human disaster. The aim will be to explore the ‘grand’ aspect of grand strategy as in ‘all-inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’, more than the aggregation of the decisions and actions of leaders.

Core reading:

Supplementary reading:
Victor Davis Hanson, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and the Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War. (New York: Random House, 2005).
In this session we will consider the Roman Empire as a unipolar world, a power configuration not to be seen again until the United States emerged as the world’s only super-power after the Cold War ended. We will explore the question of whether Roman hegemony reflected the existence of what we would now consider to be a grand strategy and if so what it was. Emphasis will be placed on the reasons the empire rose and fell, and why it lasted as long as it did. We will also consider what if anything the United States, in its own ‘unipolar moment’, might learn from the Roman precedent.

Core reading:
  Full text.

Supplementary reading:
In this session we will examine in its entirety *The Prince*, by Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), with a dual focus. On the one hand will be Machiavelli’s angle of vision: why he and his classic text are associated with the rise of modern politics and the rise of the modern nation-state. On the other hand will be the precise formula Machiavelli elaborates for statecraft and the ideas from which it derives. Particular emphasis will be placed upon Machiavelli’s philosophy of history; the use of history by leaders; the role of fate, fortune and chance; and the relationship between individual leaders and their specific historical contexts.

**Core reading:**
  * Niccolo Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, Book I (all); Book II, chs. 1-5, 13, 21, 29, 33; Book III, chs. 1-5, 35, 40-42, 48

**Supplementary reading:**
This session takes as its historical setting the positions of and relations between the European powers of the 16th and 17th centuries. Its key theme will be the connections between values, interests and ambitions; policies; strategies; and practice. More specifically, we will compare and contrast the grand strategies of Philip II and Elizabeth I, the first being the absolute monarch of a world-wide empire in Europe and Asia, with massive resources in land, troops and money, the second being Queen of a much smaller, poorer and far less populous island-state. How do we explain why the policies of the latter were so much more successful than those of the former? And what role did Philip's religious conviction and bureaucratic methods play in this story, along with those more traditional measures of national power such as budgets, navies/armies and geography?

Core reading:

Supplementary reading:
We will consider the relation between war, commerce and constitution-building. We will concentrate on late eighteenth and early nineteenth century thought about progress and the relation between commercial activity, security strategy, and the construction of republican constitutionalism. We will also begin to explore the legacy of such thought to the twentieth century by examining the constitutional documents of the League of Nations and the United Nations.

Core reading:
Federalist #1-13, 23-25, 28, 30-31, 37, 49-51.
URL: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm
Charter of the United Nations (1945), full text, esp. preamble and chapters 1-3, 6-7.
URLs: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart.htm or http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/

Supplementary reading on Kant:

Supplementary reading on Constant:
TOPIC 7: CLAUSEWITZ

Discussion Leader: John Gaddis

In this session we will focus on the single most influential work of grand strategy, Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* (1832). We will consider the circumstances that led Clausewitz (1780-1831) to write this book – chiefly on the rise of the European state system, the Napoleonic challenge to it and the lessons Clausewitz drew therefrom. We will pay particular attention to the concepts Clausewitz introduced in grand strategy: the subordination of war to statecraft, the idea of friction, the role of uncertainty and the function of planning. We will also discuss the particular difficulties of reading this work and the ways in which it has been interpreted – or misinterpreted – since its publication. Finally, we will consider the ways in which certain American leaders have used Clausewitz’s ideas as well as the relevance of his thinking for the post-Cold War world.

Core reading:


  ‘On the Nature of War’, book I, chapters 1-8

  ‘On the Theory of War’, book II, chapters 1-6

  ‘On Strategy in General: Strategy’, book III, chapter 1


  ‘War Plans: Introduction; Absolute War and Real War; War Is an Instrument of Policy’, book VIII, chapters 1, 2, 6B


Supplementary reading:


TOPIC 8: METTERNICH AND BISMARCK

Discussion Leaders: Charles Hill and Adam Tooze

We will explore peace-planning and international institution-building in practice by examining the 1815 Congress of Vienna that put an end to the Napoleonic wars and the international system that it produced, embodied in the Concert of Europe. We will concentrate mainly upon the strategic approach of Clemens Wenzel Lothar von Metternich (1773-1859) of Austria. This will be contrasted with the revolutionary innovation in European international politics brought about by one of the greatest figures of nineteenth century history, Otto von Bismarck (1810-1898). Though widely regarded as a wild, irresponsible Junker, he was brought into power in 1862 to solve the Prussian constitutional crisis, led Prussia into three successful wars (vs. Denmark, Austria, and France), created the Second German Empire in 1871, and was the dominant force in European politics for the next two decades. A conservative revolutionary? A genius who, alas, groomed no competent successor? A harbinger of Germany’s later, demonic fate?

Core reading:

Supplementary reading on Bismarck:

Supplementary reading on Metternich:
This week’s topic focuses on how the United States, a weak state on the periphery of the international system founded at the end of the 18th century upon a constitutional contradiction – that the rights of man could coexist with the legality of slavery – managed, if at great cost, not only to resolve that contradiction but also to emerge, by the end of the 19th century, as a unified state of such strength that the international system was reconfiguring itself to accommodate American leadership. Our emphasis is on the pivotal moment in that process – the Civil War – and on the equally pivotal grand strategy of Abraham Lincoln.

**Core reading:**

**Supplemental reading:**
TOPIC 10: IMPERIAL GEOPOLITICS

Discussion Leaders: Stuart Semmel and Amanda Behm

By the end of the nineteenth century, the small archipelago of the United Kingdom—a multi-national “composite state”—dominated the world’s industrial production, possessed unchallengeable naval power, and controlled one-quarter of the world’s land surface. But as newer Great Powers emerged, Britain faced challenges in all corners of the globe: in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Pacific; scrambling for new holdings in Africa; using its critical Indian base as a platform for further imperial interventions while jealously guarding British supremacy on the subcontinent. This week’s readings look at the complex relations between the British metropole and its diverse imperial holdings in the decades between the Crimean War and the First World War. Policy-makers had to treat the empire as an intricate ecology: actions taken in one colonial theater could prompt unexpected reverberations in distant hemispheres. Nor could those maintaining and expanding the “Pax Britannica” simply dictate policy to acquiescent possessions: colonial interests had to be balanced, local elites coopted, and the possibility of a new geopolitical structure, that of the “world state,” anxiously contemplated.

Core Reading:

Supplementary reading:
Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c. 1880-1932 (New York, 2000).
Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line: white men’s countries and the international challenge of racial equality (Cambridge, UK, 2008).

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This session focuses on the rise of Communism from the early twentieth century to World War II. We will emphasize in particular the political construction of the Soviet state as well as the revolutionary ideals of Communism and the global political strategy of the Communist International. We will examine the successes and failures of the efforts to put this strategy into practice both within the USSR and on the international scene, including Soviet strategy towards Nazi Germany and the upcoming war.

Core reading:

Supplementary reading:
In this session, we will look at the democratic alternatives to authoritarianism, as exemplified in the grand strategies of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. We will focus especially on the question of whether “idealism” or “realism” or some combination of both best characterizes their respective approaches to the world.

**Core reading:**


**Supplementary reading:**
Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945*.
TOPIC 13: THE COLD WAR

DISCUSSION LEADERS: JOHN GADDIS, CHARLES HILL, JEREMY FRIEDMAN

(Note: Class will meet in an alternate location for this session)

In this session we will focus on the two most influential American grand strategists of the Cold War era from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s: George F. Kennan (1904-2005) and Henry A. Kissinger (1923- ). We will examine their respective designs for waging the Cold War, as well as their ideas on how it might end. We will also consider the difficulties both statesmen had, as policy-makers, in implementing their ideas.

Core reading:
From Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), three volumes. Please read in the following order:

Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence in the Cold War,” vol. II, 417-37.

Supplementary reading:
We will spend this session discussing how the Cold War ended, which is a contentious and politicized issue in and of itself. First interpretations attributed it to the vision, flexibility, and courage of Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–). Later assessments argue that the United States in the 1980s “stumbled onto a successful strategy under Ronald Reagan” (1911–2004), comprised of support for anti-communist guerrillas, missile deployments in Western Europe, arms reduction negotiations, and the strategic defense initiative. We will consider whether, why and how a congeries of ideas and events evolved into a grand strategy of historical significance.

Core readings:
From Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), three volumes. Please read in the following order:

Archie Brown, “The Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” vol. III, 244-66.

Supplementary readings:
George Shultz, *Turmoil and Tradition: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner’s, 1994).